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1 Introduction 
 
 Some regressions can be highly misleading. In particular non-causal regressions can 
put you in trouble. For example, the literature on “aid-ineffectiveness” is littered with papers 
whose wrong conclusions deeply influenced policy-makers. The classic one is Boone (1996), 
who showed that foreign aid seems to have no impact on economic growth, without 
controlling for endogeneity. This finding was endorsed by many academic authorities and 
several books got published to develop its policy implications. Arndt et al. (2017) overturned 
this result by showing that foreign aid has a beneficial impact on economic growth and many 
other outcomes, after controlling for endogeneity in a simple two-stage approach. But donors 
have been misled for twenty years. The next section illustrates this issue by reference to a 
paper by Azam & Berlinschi (2010) that brings out that foreign aid is probably disbursed for 
reducing the inflow of immigrants from low- and lower-middle income countries, although a 
superficial look at the data suggests the opposite. In this instance, proper instrumentation is 
crucial to dispel the wrong impression given by descriptive statistics. 
 
 The present short paper aims at offering a meaningful framework for understanding 
how instrumental variables may be used to evaluate policy effectiveness using historical data. 
It brings out the strength of an identification strategy aimed at revealing the unobservable 
preferences of the policy makers, based on preference proxies. This is a crucial step to make, 
as policy makers are not necessarily very proud of their true motivations and are often keen to 
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use smoke screens to hide them. It also shows the limitations of this method, due to the 
measurement error entailed by such a use of proxies as control functions. However, it 
emphasizes that the resulting attenuation bias is playing against the econometrician in such a 
way that it reinforces the confidence that one can put in the findings when the control function 
is actually significant. The strength of this approach is then illustrated by reference to a study 
of the Naxalite conflict in India showing that the tribal insurgents cannot be accused of having 
the initiative in the armed violence, despite the Federal Government’s claims to the opposite. 
In fact, the state forces, including local police and occasional militia, have at least as much 
responsibility as the tribal people for the slaughter. 
 
2 A Case for Econometric Citizen Oversight 
 
 The key point in evaluating policy effectiveness from historical data is to control for 
the policy maker’s endogenous responses. This requires that the econometrician seeks to 
uncover the policy maker’s true preferences, which might be quite at variance with the 
proclaimed ones. For example, Azam & Berlinschi (2010) have thus shown that foreign aid is 
in fact allocated by OECD countries with a view to reduce immigration from low and lower-
middle countries. When these findings were first presented at Nuffield College in June 2009, 
Adrian Wood, who had worked a long time at DFID, came at the coffee break to tell me: 
“Jean-Paul, it is true that the Foreign Office exerted a lot of pressure on our aid allocation 
with a view to reduce immigration, but we don’t do it anymore”. He obviously crossed his 
heart with his hand in saying that, but I am not sure he expected me to believe him.  
 
2.1 Do we Buy Immigrants? 
 
 Are OECD governments so keen to attract immigrants from poor countries that they 
bribe their governments to send more of them? Eyeballing figure 1 might suggests so, as we 
observe a positive correlation between the number of migrants entering OECD countries and 
the Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursed by the host countries in this scatter 
diagram. Azam & Berlinschi (2010) have tackled this empirical puzzle and shown that this 
impression is undoubtedly misleading. Table 1 displays their most important findings. 
Column 1 shows the findings of a regression analysis that does not control for the endogeneity 
of foreign aid disbursements in response to possible surges in immigration flows from lower- 
and lower middle income countries. It shows that adding control variables helps to mitigate 
the misleading impression given by the figure 1’s scatter diagram. Adding the (lagged) 
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unemployment rate and the (lagged) share of social expenditures in GDP reduces the upward 
bias shown by the chart to insignificance. However, it leaves unexplained why rich countries 
are giving so much aid money to migrants’ source countries.  
 
 
 
 Source: Azam & Berlinschi, 2010. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Positive Correlation between Foreign Aid and Immigration 
 
2.2 Revealing Donors’ Hidden Agenda 
 
 Controlling for endogeneity solves this problem by showing that OECD countries give 
aid money because it helps to reduce immigration from low and lower middle income 
countries, among other things. This is shown at column 2 by the fact that (i) the negative 
impact of foreign aid disbursements has a highly significant impact on the flow of immigrants 
facing the donors, and (ii) the estimated endogeneity bias is also highly significant according 
to the Nakamura & Nakamura (1981) version of the Hausman (1978) test (more on this 
below). This is performed by introducing in the equation beside the endogenous regressor, 
here ODA, the residuals of the first-stage equation explaining the latter presented at column 3. 
The latter includes all the same controls as the two previous equations and public 
expenditures on order and security as the instrumental variable. Hence, right-wing 
governments, as revealed by their levels of expenditures on law and order, disburse more 
foreign aid to control immigration from poor countries than the others. 
 4
 
Table 1: Flows of Legal Migrants from Low- and Lower-Middle Income Countries 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of 
Number of Legal Migrants 
Uncontrolled 
Endogeneity 
Controlled 
Endogeneity 
First-Stage 
Equation 
Log of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) Disbursement 
0.46 
(0.32) 
-3.68*** 
(1.15) 
- 
Endogeneity Bias ODA 
 
- 4.47*** 
(1.26) 
- 
Unemployment Rate 
 
-0.30*** 
(0.09) 
-0.18*** 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Social Expenditures as a 
Percentage of GDP 
0.32*** 
(0.09) 
0.30*** 
(0.09) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
Log of per capita GDP 
 
0.54 
(1.42) 
9.53*** 
(2.82) 
1.87*** 
(0.36) 
Log of Stock of Foreign Population 0.19 
(0.57) 
0.57 
(0.50) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
Log of Public Expenditures on 
Order and Security 
  0.21*** 
(0.07) 
Number of Observations 
F-test 
118 
9.50 
117 
9.84 
159 
48.59 
Source: Azam and Berlinschi (2010) 
 
 It is thus clear that foreign aid is effective at something after all, but donors are not too 
proud to say what it is good for. It is effective for controlling immigration and it is actually 
used for that. I now have the strong suspicion that the (French) socialists prefer keeping 
fiscal resources for their own public expenditures and they raise the minimum wage and 
payroll and profit taxes, and hence unemployment, maybe to deter immigration. However, we 
did not think about performing such a test in 2009, when we researched this paper with 
Ruxanda Berlinschi. This is a pity as it would have been so easy to do then. Nevertheless this 
would explain the massive increases in payroll and corporate taxes implemented by Prime 
Minister Jean-Marc Ayraud from 2012 on under the aegis of President François Hollande, 
resulting in a predictable three percentage point increase in unemployment, at the time when 
the Libyan crisis was in full gear.  
 
3 The Case for Political Cliometrics 
 
 Econometric investigation of historical data is basically a game between civic-minded 
econometricians and policy makers whose deep motivations are potentially hidden. It is a 
basic tenet of economic theory that preferences can never be observed directly but must be 
inferred instead by analyzing observable behaviors using revealed preference theory. 
Econometricians have devised various two-stage methods that help us to discover some 
 5
determinants of policy-makers’ preferences, and thus can play a key part in informing 
citizens’ oversight. 
 
3.1 The Setting 
 
 The econometrician wants to test whether a policy tool p is effective for reducing the 
quantity q  of an outcome that the policy-maker deems “bad”. These two variables are linked 
by a linear relation: 
 
 q x p eα β γ δ ε= + − + + ,      (1) 
 
where ,  and x e ε are exogenous variables. The Greek parameters, including { }, , ,α β γ δ , are 
positive unless specified otherwise, while ε  is a random disturbance such that ( ) 0E ε = . 
 
 We make the following key assumptions: 
 
 Assumption 1: Asymmetric information: 
  (i) The policy maker observes ,  and x e p  ex ante and  q ex post . 
  (ii) The econometrician observes , and q x p ex post. 
 
 Assumption 2: Efficient Information Processing: 
  The policy maker uses her information efficiently so that ( ) 0E eε = . 
 
 Assumption 3: Quadratic Loss Function: 
  The policy maker seeks to minimize the following loss function: 
  ( )( ) ( )22 1min ,  s.t. .
2 2p
L p E q E q x p eπ θ α β γ δ⎛ ⎞= + + = + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (2) 
 
 The parameter θ  increases the policy maker’s aversion to q  and it is her private 
information, i.e., unobserved by the econometrician. 
 
 The policy decision is derived from this model by solving (2) to yield the first-order 
condition: 
 
 ( )( ) ( )* * * *p E q E q pππ γ θ θγ⎛ ⎞= + ⇔ = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .    (3) 
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 Figure 2 depicts the outcome of this optimization exercise performed by the policy 
maker. The downward-sloping line represents the causal equation taken as the constraint by 
the policy maker according to (2), while the upward-sloping line represents the first-order 
condition (3). The choice made by her is found at the intersection of the two lines. It is then 
obvious from the diagram that the chosen value of the policy variable *p  is a function first of 
the set of parameters { }, , , ,α β γ δ π  but also and more importantly of the pair of 
unobservable variables { }, eθ .  
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Policy Maker’s Optimal Choice 
 
 The presence of this pair of unobservable variables lies at the heart of the 
identification problem faced by the econometrician. The key point is that they impact the 
econometrician’s problem in two opposite directions. Changes in θ  across observations are 
playing on the econometrician’s side, as they just shift the upward-sloping line, to the right in 
case of an increase in θ , tracing out the causal relations under scrutiny. However, changes in 
e  across observations are playing against the econometrician, as an increase in e  would shift 
the downward-sloping line upwards and would thus contaminate the estimation of the causal 
relation. Imagine now that the two unobservable variables θ   and e  turned out to be 
positively correlated in the econometrician’s sample, although they might in fact be 
independent in theory and would be so in a very large sample. Then, the two lines would tend 
p 
E ( q ) 
E ( q )* 
p* 
( ) pπ γ θ−
x eα β δ+ +
( )γ θ π
x eα β δ
γ
+ +
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on average to move in the same direction and an upward-sloping regression line might result 
from the estimation process if the variance of e  is larger than that of θ . In such a case, 
regression analysis would tell you more about the fortuitous correlation that exist in your 
sample between the two unobserved variables that about the true slope of the causal relation 
that you are looking for.  
 
3.2 Preference Proxies 
 
 Imagine now that the econometrician is tempted to guess that the preference proxy z  
such that: 
 
 zθ ρ μ ς= + +  and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0E E e E E zς ς ς ε ς= = = =   (4) 
 
might have some empirical relevance. This is a testable piece of guesswork using a two-stage 
approach to overcome the problem that θ  is not directly observable. The idea is to capture 
some of the beneficial identifying property of the changes in the policy maker’s preferences 
over the sample thanks to the preference proxy z  using a first-stage equation that explains the 
policy decisions actually made. Then, most of that equation’s unobservable disturbance will 
reveal the changes in e rather than in θ.  Hence, that remaining unobservable disturbance will 
encapsulate some information about the policy-maker’s information about e  that can in fact 
be estimated via the first-stage equation. This is done by estimating a reduced-form equation 
for the chosen policy tool, which thus reveals the hidden information used by the policy 
maker as the residuals. This works as follows: 
 
 Substituting the preference proxy for θ  , the FOC becomes: 
 
 ( )E q p zπ ρ μ ςγ
⎛ ⎞= − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .       (5) 
 We can substitute for ( )E q x p eα β γ δ= + − +  and rearrange the terms to get the 
reduced-form policy equation as:  
 
 ( ) ( )2 2 2 2
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
*
a c rb
p x z e
γ α ρ γ β γ μ γ δ ςπ γ π γ π γ π γ
+= + + + ++ + + +????? ??? ??? ???????
   (6) 
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where rˆ  are the residuals of the regression of on  and p x z . Notice that (i) rˆ  is correlated 
with e , but (ii) it contains some noise produced by ς , whose variance is lower the better z  
does proxy for θ . 
 
 Then, it is straightforward to show that the second stage regression equation yields 
under the control-function approach exactly the same estimates as 2SLS would in linear 
models: 
 
 ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆq x p r x p r rα β γ φ ε α β γ φ γ ε= + − + + = + − − + − + ,  (7) 
 
where ˆp r−  is the fitted value of p  from the first-stage equation, what 2SLS uses as the 
regressor, and rˆ  can be dropped from this latter regression equation, as it is orthogonal to all 
the included regressors, by construction. This proves the exact equivalence between the two 
methods of controlling for endogeneity in linear models. However, the control function 
approach yields the natural test for endogeneity that φˆ  is significantly different from zero (see 
Nakamura & Nakamura, 1981), and it can be used in many other contexts where 2SLS are 
inappropriate. In particular, it works when the assumed distribution is a negative binomial, the 
most popular assumption when analyzing count data. Notice that rˆ  is a noisy proxy for e , as 
explained above. This entails that there is a measurement issue that will bias φˆ  towards zero, 
i.e., against the endogeneity assumption. Hence, this attenuation bias will play against the 
econometrician and it will often reject the endogeneity diagnosis while it should be validated. 
In contrast, when the endogeneity test concludes significantly by rejecting exogeneity, then 
the econometrician’s confidence in the endogeneity diagnosis is obviously strengthened by 
the bias.     
 
4 An Example of Political Interpretation 
 
 The residuals from the first-stage equation are a proxy for some information that (i) is 
observed by the policy maker when she makes her decision, (ii) is entering the causal 
relation, and (iii) is not directly observed by the econometrician. Hence, although it is biased 
towards zero, the control-function approach is providing the econometrician with a crucial 
piece of information about the information used by the policy maker to choose her policy 
intervention, if it is statistically significant. Jean-Paul Azam & Kartika Bhatia (2017) have 
used this argument to deny the claim that the rebels are the aggressors in India’s Naxalite 
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conflict. Table 2 reports their basic findings. The dependent variables are respectively the 
number of civilians killed by the police (1) and the number of people killed by the rebels (2). 
 
Table 2: Two-Stage Estimation of Numbers of Persons Killed by Each Side 
 
Variables (1) 
State Forces 
(2) 
Rebellion 
State Forces  0.75** (0.0033) 
Residuals  0.025* (0.015) 
Iron Resources 3.239 (3.409) 1.285*** (0.404) 
Coal Resources 9.453** (4.470) 0.877** (0.361 
Tribal Population -0.492*** (0.142) - 
Forest Cover Rate -0.137* (0.081) - 
Tribal ∗ Iron 0.314** (0.129) - 
Tribal ∗ Coal -0.105 (0.192) - 
Tribal ∗ Forest 0.020*** (0.003) - 
Other Controls Yes Yes 
Ln alpha  1.087*** (0.135) 
Observations 191 191 
Adjusted R2 0.3848  
F-Statistics (prob > F) 10.90 (0.000)  
Source: Azam & Bhatia (2017). Column (1) is estimated by OLS while (2) is a negative 
binomial regression. 
 
4.1 Basic Findings 
 
 We find here that the residuals of the first-stage equation are significant in the second-
stage one. This reveals that there is a piece of information that is affecting simultaneously the 
killing performed by the two sides. This measure of the impact on the number of people killed 
by the local forces is just estimated as that part of the police violence that cannot be explained 
by the control variables and the instruments introduced in the first-stage equation, as 
explained above. On the one hand, this might simply capture some orders given by the 
hierarchy to the policemen or militiamen, when relevant, unobserved by the econometrician. 
On the other hand, that information should have leaked to the rebels who got organized very 
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quickly to retaliate. This tends to strain credulity given the rebels’ known level of 
organization (Roy, 2011, Shah, 2010). More realistically, this might simply capture the fact 
that the rebels have observed the numbers of tribal people killed in the districts and have 
apportioned their retaliation to those numbers. It thus seems that the rebels know how much 
violence has been inflicted on the tribal people when they attack the policemen, what would 
not make sense if they really were the aggressors as claimed by the Federal and State 
governments. The significance of the positive impacts on the rebellion’s activity of the 
presence of iron or coal resources hints at the part played by mining interests in triggering the 
uprising. 
 
4.2 Political Diagnosis 
 
 Then, we find that the observed number of people killed by the local forces has a 
highly significant positive impact on the killing perpetrated by the rebels, an estimate that is 
“purged” of the endogenous reverse causality by the control for endogeneity. Hence, police 
killing of civilians is a major cause of the Naxalite uprising. This disproves the federal 
government’s claim that the Adivasis are animated by the Maoist ideology with a view to 
topple the Indian democracy. The positive impact of the killing performed by the local forces 
deserves a bit more emphasis, by comparison with the theoretical framework discussed in the 
previous section. There, a negative sign was specified for the impact of the policy variable p 
to capture the idea that the outcome variable q was deemed bad by the policy maker. Azam & 
Bhatia (2017) introduce the concept of “provocation” to capture the idea that the rebels’ 
violence does not seem to be regarded as a “bad” in that sense by the policy maker. Moreover, 
a closer look at the first-stage regression allows us to look deeper into the fundamental 
motivations for these attacks, via the preference proxies that are used as instrumental 
variables.  
 
 We observe first that the presence of a large Adivasis population and a large forest 
cover rate, where the former live most often, come up with a significant negative sign. Hence, 
the police seem to stay away from such poor areas. However, most of the killing of civilians 
performed by the state police occurs in areas where a large share of the people are tribal ones 
and there are significant deposits of iron ore and a significant forest cover. The latter mainly 
exists where bauxite deposits retain the mountains’ moisture in these semi-arid areas (Padel & 
Das, 2010). Hence, it is the interaction between the presence of mining potential riches and 
the largely tribal population of the area that entails significant violence against civilians by the 
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police, although the presence of coal resources seems to attract police violence independently 
of the importance of the tribal population in the district.  
 
4 Conclusion 
 
 Carefully chosen preference proxies give the civic-minded econometrician a valuable 
tool to uncover the policy-makers’ deep motivations that determine their decisions. Using 
two-stage econometric analysis of real-world data can thus play a key part in informing 
citizens’ oversight in democracies and authoritarian regimes. The objective pursued is to 
estimate simultaneously whether the policy tool has a significant impact on the outcome of 
interest and is actually used for that by the policy maker. 
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